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Padania - Utopia or Reality
Vilctor radie
In early August 1996, the striking double
of the Lega Nord (Northern League), Umberto
Bossi and Irene Pivetti, the young Speaker of the
House of Representatives, suddenly parted ways.
After the last Parliamentary elections in Italy, in
April 1996, Bossi and Pivetti always appeared to-
gether at allmeetings and rallies of the Lega Nord.
Bossi remained true to his idea of detaching the
northern part of Italy from the rest of the country
and turning it into a separate geopolitical entity.
Actually, Bossi initially upheld a federative idea,
which Pivetti endorsed, together with the other
members of the League. However, when Bossi
radicalized his ideas to the extreme, calling for
the partition of northern Italy, Pivetti dissociated
herself from him and left the leadership of the
Lega Nord.
The Italian Government took Bossi's state-
ments at best half-seriously, since one of his main
arguments for separation from Italy was the need
to put an end to the drain of money from the rich
North to the South, which is inactive and has been
living for decades on allocations from the state
budget. Partly to blame for this situation in the
South are the local criminal organizations: the
Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan Camorra and the
Calabrian N'drangheta, which have thwarted all
serious state projects in the Italian South, leaving
the population destitute and unemployed, and liv-
ing in constant fear.
STORIES OF SECESSION
The Government was aware that the South
was partly living off the North, starting from the
higher taxes and other levies that the inhabitants
of the North had to payout of their higher in-
comes in order to maintain a tolerable living stan-
dard in the southern part of the country. Recog-
nizing the truth of at least some of Bossi's slogans
about the poor South ruining them all, together
with Rome, which - as Bossi persistently claims -
"steals" money from the North in order to main-
tain its enormous and inefficient administration,
the Italian Government did not respond to Bossi's
frequent pronouncements, in which the leader of
the Lega Nord was no longer satisfied with sto-
ries about the federation but made increasing ref-
erences to secession - finding more and more sup-
porters of this idea. Some claimed that Bossi was
deliberately holding out for more but would be
satisfied with less, i.e. that he was demanding sepa-
ration from Italy in order to obtain a federation.
However, it was shown that Bossi genuinely
wanted more than a federation, when, about a year
ago, he started to speak openly about the possi-
bility of seceding.
Taking advantage of the involvement of
other political leaders in their own power
struggles, during the electoral campaign he openly
endorsed the separation of the northern part from
the rest of Italy and called for the establishment
of the state of Padania, a name derived from the
fertile region along the River Po (Lat. Padus),
even naming September 15th, 1996, as the date
when the people of "Padania" would finally opt
for a state of their own. Some of the media re-
corded Bossi's pronouncements with more or less
mockery, naming all the various reasons why a
secession was unfeasible. Other media, however,
warned that this was a serious issue.
As the day of September 15th, 1996,neared,
the Italian Minister of the Interior Giorgio
Napolitano became increasingly convinced that
the situation was grave and warned Bossi to be
careful about what he was saying. The problem
was also augmented by the fact that August is the
holiday month, that all politicians were absent
from Rome, and that all kinds of rumours were
circulating in the newspapers. By the time the
politicians reassembled in Rome there were only
about 15 days left till the announced act of seces-
sion. The question was: if Bossi proves to be seri-
ous about it, will there be enough time for effec-
tive counteraction, or at least for prevention, and
whether anything might happen that would earn
negative international points for Italy. Matters
became radicalized to such an extent as to induce
Bossi to declare he would demolish TV transmit-
ters in the North because he did not want state
television programmes to be aired in "Padania".
Bossi even went so far as to call Italian Presi-
dent Scalfaro an opponent, albeit a "correct" one.
Scalfaro, for his part, congratulated Napolitano
for not disregarding the problem of secession.
Prime Minister Prodi also went public, stating he
was permanently in touch with the Minister of the
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Interior and that "matters were under control".
In short, Bossi's words spread fear, but what was
evenmore alarming was the state's inertia, accord-
ing to the rightist factions, who blamed Minister
Napolitano for not having raided the headquar-
ters of the Lega Nord and taken other serious
steps, which would have been more appropriate
than his declaration that the Government was
prepared to deal with any violations of the law
before, during and after September 15th, 1996.
Scalfaro had, namely, never permitted even the
mention of secession, while leaving room for talk
about a federation. Moreover, at a June rally, he
said: "Woe to those who aim to break national
and state unity", referring to Bossi, and added that
even the very idea of separation might lead to
"punishable lawlessness".
THE UNDERESTIMATED ISSUE OF PADANIA
By mid-August all media were following
developments by reporting Bossi's and other poli-
ticians' statements, not because it was the "silly
season" and there was no important political news
but because the secession issue had really become
the hottest political topic. The Minister of Public
Works Antonio Di Pietro openly threatened Bossi
with criminal prosecution like Craxi and Forlani
unless he gave up his secessionist intents. Prime
Minister Prodi continued to advise people to keep
a cool head and, if they wanted to defeat Bossi, to
start being serious about federalism. In mid-Au-
gust, the Speaker of the Italian Senate Nicola
Mancino proposed a referendum asking the citi-
zens if they supported secession. As usual, half
the people accepted the proposal, while the other
half rejected it, because some thought this would
only help Bossi while others claimed that the ref-
erendum would put an end to the story about se-
cession in Italy. But Bossi's words could not be
ignored. Bossi was backed to some degree by the
Mayor ofMilan Marco Formentini (whowasmore
in favour of federalism, less of secession), and he
was also promised support by the leader of the
Italian radicals Marco Panella. The National Sec-
retary of the Lega Lombarda Roberto Calderoli
accused some influential politicians of using
"Stalinist methods" when they demanded from
the Minister of the Interior not to trust the may-
ors of those towns which supported Bossi.
In spite of the markedly theatrical nature
of his appearances, Bossi pursued a very definite
goal: secession. The events of the 1990s seemed
to have lent him a hand. Some of the "imperial"
ideological constructions, like the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia, fell apart, giving rise to national
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states, one after the other. Global economic rea-
sons impose new alliances in Europe, weakening
both the old and the new states, from the Atlan-
tic Ocean to the Ural. Bossi was aware of all the
problems (which actually acted in his favour): the
Italian intellectuals complain about the loss of
national identity; the business community is
watching the growing gap between the Italian
South and North; politicians admit increasingly
candidly the inefficacy of the state machinery;
trade unions stress the damage done by central-
ized government; the young do not recognize in
the present state the purpose and meaning it
ought to have; and public opinion demands liter-
ally tangible changes. Bossi was therefore more
than justified in adopting such a position, for the
"patience which was running out" was on his side.
This required a political answer from the state,
but it failed to come about. Namely, as serious
observers of the Italian scene remark, if the state
thought that Bossi's outbursts were just plays from
the summer repertory, why was the Minister of
the Interior asked to take decisive action? If a
threat is considered real, then politicians do not
take a summer vacation but stay on their job.
On the other hand, Mancini's proposal to
hold a referendum on secession also had its weak-
nesses. If a referendum had been called, namely,
Bossiwould have probably lost, but he would have
become a victim - which would equal heroism in
the current Italian situation. If Mancini had had
hisway, all Italians would have had to saywhether
they wanted a parliamentary or a presidential
Republic, whether they wanted a President of the
Republic or a Prime Minister, a federal or a
confederal state, etc. Italy could not go on living
for ever with the secession issue hanging over its
head, without knowing the actual views of that
part of the population who endorsed it or what
boundaries such a structure would have. This,
too, indicated that the problem of Padania was
underestimated. It was argued that Bossi was in-
capable of conducting "constructive" policies.
However, he might win if he could prove that the
government was incompetent and that the ruling
class was inert - and he was quite close to proving
just that, as he himself knew.
Finally the 15th of September 1996dawned,
the day Bossi had named as the day the North
would secede from the rest of Italy. Some were
curious, some a little apprehensive, the rest were
indifferent. In Venice, Bossi read out the decla-
ration of independence from Italy. The police
ensured peace and order, no major incidents oc-
curred. Members of the Lega Nord held rallies in
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all larger towns in the north. Television showed
the newlyprinted Padanian banknotes with Bossi's
picture, aswell as subscription forms for Padanian
television, which seemed to leave the audiences
unimpressed. On the same day, in Milan, the
leader of the rightist party Alleanza Nazionale
(National Alliance) Gianfranco Fini rallied over
one hundred thousand of his own followers to call
for national unity against Bossi's secession. Their
real motive, though, was to accuse their centre-
left political opponents in the Government for
having done little or nothing to oppose secession
and preserve national unity. In this manner, Fini
and his supporters made use of Bossi' rallies to
promote their own party.
President Scalfaro spent September 15th,
1996, in Bari, where he opened the autumn fair
and spoke about the attempt to break up Italy and
about the foreseeable consequences of such an
act, stressing that upholding federalism was one
thing and trying to split the country was a differ-
ent matter. Scalfaro then went on to say that any
manifestation aimed at the free expression of
views must be permitted, whether we like it or
not, and nothing must be done to prevent it. How-
ever, if this should turn into incitement to com-
mit unlawful acts, the judiciary was competent to
deal with such cases and to apply the criminal
code, because, as he put it, "a democracy that
would hesitate to apply the criminal code would
not deserve to live". If everybody does his duty,
democracy will not be in jeopardy, Scalfaro in-
sisted, adding that Italy had been through other
pathological times in its history but had tran-
scended all of them. The Italian President did not
spare the journalists either, accusing them ofhav-
ing built a climate of unease bywriting, especially
in recent times, almost exclusively about the par-
tition of Italy. Instead of this, it would be better
to think about the problems of Southern, Central
and Northern Italy, about the great problems of
education, health, and above all of unemploy-
ment. For this reason, the idea of federalism
should be endorsed, which has no opponents in
Parliament. A day later, all Italian newspapers
were full of reports about the secession of
Padania. A war of numbers broke out. According
to official reports by the Ministry of the Interior,
a little over one hundred thousand members and
supporters of the Lega Nord had gathered on the
River Po, while Bossi claimed there had been over
one million of them. At his press conference he
attacked the journalists, calling them servants of
the state, unfair and cheats. After Bossi's an-
nouncement that he would set up a "people's mi-
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litia", the so-called Green Shirts, the Ministry of
the Interior threatened both Bossi and his future
Padanian militia with arrest. To make matters
even worse, this was not only the attitude of the
courts in Rome but was also upheld by the courts
in Mantua, the citywhich Bossi has designated as
the seat of the Padanian Parliament.
BOSSI WANTS TO NEGOTIATE
Three days after Bossi's declaration of in-
dependence, the police paid visits to several of-
fices of the Northern League. This was done clum-
sily,and only served Bossi's cause. At the League's
headquarters in Verona a scuffle developed be-
tween the police and members of the Lega Nord.
Roberto Maroni, one of the key figures in the
Lega, had to be taken to the hospital. Bossi im-
mediately charged the Ministry of the Interior
with abuse of power and civil rights violation, and
even accused the state of introducing a "fascist
regime". The hasty decision of the Public
Prosecutor's Office in Verona to search the pre-
mises of the League met with public disapproval,
all the more so as the Minister of the Interior dis-
sociated himself from the raid, saying that the
search warrant had not been issued by him but by
the Public Prosecutor in Verona. This, again,
helped Bossi's cause, and the incident was dis-
cussed in the Italian Parliament, since the Mem-
bers demanded an explanation about the police
raid and about the Government's stance towards
the Bossi phenomenon in general. This was also
prompted by the statement made by President
Scalfaro, who joined Prime Minister Prodi in say-
ing that the Lega needed a political response, thus
implying that Bossi's Padania could not be re-
garded as a momentary political fad.
Bossi signalled he wished to negotiate. A
day after the police raid in Verona, Bossi sent a
message saying that, in response to the appeals
by President Scalfaro and Premier Prodi, he was
willing to sit down with them at the negotiating
table and discuss new legislation and the new
Constitution. On Sunday, September 22, 1996, at
the closing ceremony of the "Unit a" Festival in
Modena, the leader of the Party of the Demo-
cratic Left D'Alema first used the "stick", saying
that it was time to stop the exhibitionism (refer-
ring to Bossi), but then used the "carrot", stating
that there existed "dangerous problems and that
joint effort is necessary in order to resolve them"
(again referring to Bossi, but taking him seriously
this time). What D'Alema calls exhibitionism,
Bossi calls a political act. A dialogue can only take
place if the other party participates in it. "If
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D'Alema is Italy", Bossi states, "I am only the
Ambassador of Padania, its humble servant". This
was the signal Bossi sent to Rome, indicating he
wanted talks, not police repression. It is now up
to Rome to make the right step, otherwise there
is no alternative to secession. The leader of the
Lega Nord will not tolerate Rome's disparaging
remarks about the events in the north. If Rome
continues to mock them, then, according to Bossi,
there will be no chance of negotiations. For the
time being, in Bossi's opinion, two legislations are
in force in Italy, the Padanian and the Italian. A
way ought to be found to unify this dualism, and
the invitation to political talks about the neces-
sary new laws and constitutional amendments
should come from the parliamentary majority, i.e.
from the left centre.
In mid-November 1996, the spokesman of
the Lega Nord Roberto Maroni gave a press con-
ference in Milan and announced that voting for
the "Padanian Parliament" would be held on 9th
March 1997. A total of 260 members of parlia-
ment would be elected, and all persons over 16
years of age would have the right to vote. "We
shall call the election for the Parliament of
Padania - Maroni said - because we think that no
good can come for Padania from Rome. All citi-
zens who have reached the age of sixteen will be
able to vote because Padania counts a great deal
on young people". In Maroni's estimate, the elec-
torate would number some 28million people from
the provinces of Piedmont, Liguria, Valle d'Aosta,
Emilia Romagna, Friuli, Venezia Giulia, Veneto,
Lombardy, Trentino, South Tyrol, Umbria,
Marche and Tuscany. And this is not all: on Sep-
tember 14, 1997, a year after the manifestations
for secession, "the peoples of the North will be
called to the second decisive event, the referen-
dum on self-determination". The question that
will have to be answered by the voters of North-
ern Italy on that occasion will be: "Do you wish to
put into effect the declaration of independence
and sovereignty of September 15th, 1996, and to
make Padania a federal republic within regional
Europe and the Europe of nations as of today?"
Maroni also announced that the referendum
would be ensured by "delegations of foreign states
and perhaps by a UN delegation". He also stated
that "contacts at international level, leading to the
establishment of a committee for the creation of
a democratic party of European nations" were in
progress, in the light of the 1999 European elec-
.tions,
At the same time, in mid-November, the
Italian political scene was marked by a conflict
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between two large opposing political groupings,
the left centre and the right centre, a conflict full
of tension and uncertainty. In the Italian Parlia-
ment, namely, no agreement could be reached on
the famous "la finanziaria", the state budget. The
government of the left centre, headed by Prime
Minister Prodi and the leader of the democratic
left D'Alema, were in great distress because the
adoption of the budget involved drastic tax in-
creases and other burdens imposed on the citi-
zens as a condition of entry into the European
Union. The right centre (Berlusconi) took ad-
vantage of the dissatisfaction this caused and or-
ganized demonstrations, which brought into the
streets of Rome the impressive figure of between
800 thousand and one million citizens. The gov-
ernment found itself tom between two threats:
on the one hand the fear that it would be over-
thrown, and on the other the fear that it might
not be able to fulfil the promise given before the
elections that it would lead Italy into Europe. In
this awkward political moment the representatives
of the Lega Nord again raised their voices, en-
couraged by the chaotic situation and by the fact
that the Government was too busy to pay much
attention to them (with the exception of Presi-
dent Scalfaro, who constantly pleaded for national
unity). In addition, commentaries full of warnings
appeared in the Italian press, saying that the ref-
erendum announced by the League was either a
meaningless farce or an issue to be taken very
seriously indeed, and suggesting that Rome's view
on Padania inclined towards the former interpre-
tation, namely, that it was a farce.
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INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION
It would seem that both the Government
and the media underestimated the meeting of the
League held on 15 September 1996 when they
dismissed it as a failure. But the Lega Nord is in
no hurry. Furthermore, it has already succeeded
in transforming secession from a taboo topic into
a legitimate project, which can be the subject of
discussion and around which people can be ral-
lied, regardless of how many of them there are.
The war of numbers is senseless, for whether there
were 2000 or 200,000 independence-seekers who
gathered by the River Po, the fact remains that
this was a kind of legitimization and also exposed
Italian institutions to ridicule. In the meantime,
the League managed to collect 10,000 names of
applicants for the "National Guard", one-third of
whom were not even supporters of Bossi. Al-
though it is true that Bossi is no Napoleon or
Cavour, it is also true that he is the only Italian
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leader with a concrete project, and this was re-
flected in the elections aswell as in the latest opin-
ion polls. Bossi is good at finding his way through
the Italian political-institutional chaos. He will
most probably not lead Padania to independence,
because public opinion in the North would prob-
ably not endorse him. But, for Bossi, the League
is a means to unsettle and expose to ridicule the
Italian governmental machinery, but it will be
probably left to somebody else to lead the way to
a possibly independent Padania. After all, having
once opted for secession, the League cannot go
back. One does not even have to know Italian his-
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tory too well to realize that any federal project at
regional, or even municipal, level would mean the
disintegration of the state. A debate about Italy
as a "central" or a "federal" state is practically
meaningless, especially if it is conducted in ideo-
logical terms. What would be much more impor-
tant would be to restore the legitimacy, prestige
and effectiveness of Italian national institutions.
In other words, the choice is not between "feder-
alism" and "centralism" but between Italy and
anarchy. Time will soon show which of the two
will prevail.
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